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THE STANDARD OF CARE IN THE
CREDIT INDUSTRY
FRANK F DAILY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Computers are an integral part of modem society. Today, scien-
tists measure information transmission in the billionths of a second
and store libraries of information on microchips smaller than a
dime.' With the aid of computers, businesses compile massive
amounts of data pertaining to an individual and transmit that infor-
mation with ease. This technological capability, however, has cre-
ated two crucial legal issues: 1) what information pertaining to a
consumer's financial background and credit history should a com-
pany be permitted to report? and 2) how can consumers guarantee
that the company reports this information accurately?
The first issue concerns the consumer's right of privacy, an issue
that became very topical in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 2 Congress
* A.B., Duke University, 1981; J.D., Washington University, 1984.
. A survey of 1500 organizations showed that over 90% of their record keeping
operations were computerized. In 1979, the top 50 U.S. data processing companies
had revenues in excess of 30 billion dollars. Vogell, Law and Computers: Current
Issues, 43 TEX. B.J. 757 (1980). See generally Tunick, Computer Law: An Overview, 13
Loy. L.A.L. REy. 315 (1980) (discussing the massive influence of computers on
society).
2. See generally Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a
New Technology in an Information Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1091 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Miller, Personal PrivacA; Miller, Computers, Data Banks and In-
dividual Privacy. An Overview, 4 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 1 (1972-73) [hereinafter
cited as Miller, Computers]; Note, Protecting Privacy in Credit Reporting, 24 STAN. L.
REV. 550 (1972).
Professor Miller, who has studied the subject extensively, explains why privacy has
become an issue in information processing. He suggests that privacy was easy to
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addressed the need to protect the consumer's right of privacy3 by en-
acting the Federal Privacy Act of 1974.4 The second issue, regarding
the accuracy.of credit information, continues to trouble consumers.
Consumers seem to understand that they must surrender a certain
amount of personal information if they are to avail themselves of
many services.' Hospitals, insurers, and retailers require information
about customers before they can provide them with goods or serv-
ices.' Although this surrender of consumer privacy is necessary, con-
sumers should nonetheless demand that the information retained and
protect before extensive use of computers because: I) Large quantities of information
about individuals were not available; 2) the available information generally was de-
centralized; 3) the available information was relatively superficial; 4) access to infor-
mation was difficult to secure; 5) people in a highly mobile society were difficult to
monitor, and 6) most people were unable to interpret and infer revealing information
from available data. Miller, Computers, supra, at 8.
3. One noteworthy commission that examined the issues of technology and pri-
vacy was the Privacy Protection Study Commission (PPSC). The PPSC set forth
three objectives for its work with privacy legislation: "minimizing intrusiveness, max-
imizing fairness, and creating legitimate enforceable expectations of confidentiality."
Feldman & Gordin, Privacy and Personal Information Reporting: The Legislative
Boom, 35 Bus. LAw. 1259, 1271 (1980).
4. Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a) (1982)). The private sector also expressed the need for controls. Indeed, the
computer industry itself continues to offer solutions to the problem as shown by this
excerpt from an IBM advertisement appearing in the New York Times:
At IBM, we think computers should be as good at protecting information as
they are at processing it.
Here are some things we're doing about that.
So that only the right people see information about you, IBM systems can be
programmed to demand identification in various ways. They can require pass-
words or numbers, or keys, or magnetically coded I.D. cards, or combinations of
them.
With many IBM systems, certain information can be reserved solely for the
people who need it. A person who needs only your name and address cannot
learn anything else about you.
We have systems that scramble computer signals sent over wires. So eaves-
droppers can't listen in.
We're even experimenting with devices that recognize people by their signa-
ture rhythms.
With innovations like these, computers can be more than safe places to keep
information.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1980, 3A, at 24, quoted in Comment, The Use andAbuse of Com-
puterized Information: Striking a Balance Between Personal Privacy Interests and Or-
ganizational Information Needs, 44 ALB. L. REv. 589, 614 n.156 (1980).
5. Comment, supra note 4, at 601.
6. Id
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circulated is accurate,7 especially considering the importance of a
credit rating in the marketplace.'
Today, the primary means of guaranteeing the accuracy of per-
sonal information collected by credit agencies is through the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).9 This Note focuses on section 1681e
of the FCRA, which demands that agencies exercise reasonable care
to ensure maximum accuracy in credit reporting.10 This Note first
describes the remedies available to consumers at common law for
inaccurately reported information." After this overview, the Note
considers the FCRA and examines the Act's threshold requirement
that information be clearly inaccurate before a consumer may chal-
lenge it.'2 It also investigates the definition of "reasonable proce-
dures" for gathering and collecting information on consumers as set
forth in the Act. 13 Finally, the Note analyzes the reasonableness of
procedures for processing and reporting the data once it is collected,
particularly in light of the credit industry's immense dependence on
computer technology.' 4
7. Id.
8. One court noted:
Data banks keep track of us all. They record evidence of our credit worthiness,
our character, and our style of living. They report this information to potential
employers or lenders. In our complex society, data banks of personal informa-
tion seem necessary evils: necessary, because they quickly inform vulnerable in-
stitutions about people; evil, because their information may be inaccurate and
because they may brand us with the Scarlet Letter of lost events best forgotten.
Goodnough v. Alexanders, Inc., 82 Misc. 2d 662, 663, 370 N.Y.S.2d 388, 389 (Sup. Ct.
1975) (mem.).
9. Pub. L. No. 91-508, Title VI, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1982)).
10. Throughout this Note, "consumer report," "credit report," and "credit rating"
will be used synonymously to indicate the product of a consumer reporting agency.
The Fair Credit Reporting Act defines a consumer reporting agency as follows:
(f) The term "consumer reporting agency" means any person which, for
monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in
whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit in-
formation or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing con-
sumer reports to third parties. ..
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (1982).
11. See infra notes 15-27 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 28-61 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 62-90 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 91-125 and accompanying text.
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II. COMMON LAW REMEDIES
Before Congress began regulating the credit industry, consumers
harmed by an inaccurate credit report could resort only to common
law remedies 5 or, in a few states, to state statutory remedies. 6 If a
consumer claimed that the information in a credit report was errone-
ous, he or she could bring an action for either invasion of privacy or
defamation. 7 Defamation actions were the most common,"8 proba-
bly because a plaintiff could establish a prima facie case merely by
alleging that the defendant made a defamatory statement to a third
party.' 9 To be defamatory, the statement must infringe on the plain-
tiff's reputation and good name in the community.20 For example, a
plaintiff could meet the requirements for a prima facie case if a credit
report improperly labeled him a drunk, a bankrupt, or an immoral
15. Feldman & Gordin, supra note 3, at 1260. For an exhaustive history of com-
mon law actions prior to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, see Ullman, Liability of
Credit Bureaus ,4fer the Fair Credit Reporting Act: The Needfor Further Reform, 17
VILL. L. REV. 44 (1971).
16. Before Congress passed the FCRA, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York and
Oklahoma had enacted statutes concerning the liability of credit bureaus to consum-
ers. See Ullman, supra note 15, at 58.
17. Feldman & Gordin, supra note 3, at 1260. The question of the invasion of
privacy through credit reports is beyond the scope of this Note. This Note accepts the
essential propriety of a credit report. Instead, it focuses on the means of assuring the
accuracy of the information. Nevertheless, the right to privacy was occasionally used
to combat the excesses of credit agencies. Scholars look to an article by Justices War-
ren and Brandeis as the origin of the right to privacy. See Warren & Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). This right is actually a collection of
four types of torts: I) intrusion upon a plaintiff's solitude; 2) public disclosure of
private facts; 3) placing the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and 4) appropri-
ation of a plaintiff's name or likeness. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 117, at 804-18 (4th ed. 1971). Although types two and three seem to apply to
the credit industry, Professor Prosser states: "Unquestionably, reasonable investiga-
tions of credit . . . are privileged." Id. at 818.
18. Comment, Fair Credit Reporting Act: Constitutional Defects of the Limitation
of Liability Clause, II Hous. L. REV. 424, 427 (1974). See also Note, Protecting the
Subjects of Credit Reports, 80 YALE L.J. 1035, 1049 (1971). Very simply, defamation
is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will,
or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory, or un-
pleasant feelings or opinions against him. W. PROSSER, supra note 17, § I 1l, at 739.
Although malice need not be shown, it necessarily involves the idea of disgrace. Id.
§ 113, at 772.
19. W. PROSSER, supra note 17, § 11, at 737.
20. Id.
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person. Thus, the defamation cause of action seemed well-suited for
insuring accuracy in credit reporting.
The courts, however, intentionally restricted the availability of the
defamation remedy.2 Because of the importance of credit agencies
to a community's economic well-being, many courts were reluctant to
burden the agencies with the task of defending defamation suits. 22
Thus, they extended the defense of "conditional privilege" to the
agencies.23 This defense absolved the agencies from liability unless
plaintiffs could show that the agencies had acted with malice in pub-
lishing defamatory statements.24 The conditional privilege was avail-
able to persons who, in fulfilling a legal or moral obligation to speak,
published statements that turned out to be defamatory.25 The courts
made the conditional privilege available to credit agencies because
the agencies had an obligation to disclose a person's financial records
when a merchant requested this information.26 Thus, for the sake of
market efficiency, agencies were able to pass on to consumers the
costs of damages resulting from mishandling or inaccurately report-
ing a person's credit information.27
21. Note, supra note 18, at 1049-50.
22. Id. at 1052-53.
23. Id. at 1050.
24. Id. at 1050-51. The privilege also failed to protect agencies that disseminated
the defamatory information to persons not entitled to it, or for an improper purpose.
Id. at 1050 n.83.
25. Id, at 1050.
26. Comment, supra note 18, at 427. See, e.g., Watwood v. Stone's Mercantile
Agency, 194 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (defendant credit agency not guilty of defama-
tion despite fact that credit report falsely suggested that plaintiff was unmarried and a
mother).
27. See Note, supra note 18, at 1054.
One commentator justifies the conditional privilege for credit-related communica-
tions by stating:
If such communications are not protected by the law from the danger of vexa-
tious litigation in cases where they turn out to be incorrect in fact, the stability of
men engaged in trade and commerce would be exposed to the greatest hazard,
for no man would answer an inquiry as to the solvency of another. . . . Can it
be desirable to impose conditions of immunity so stringent as to discourage the
giving of information and thus diminish materially the probability that the de-
sired information will be obtained by persons in need of it?
Smith, Conditional Privilegefor Mercantile Agencies, 14 COLUM. L. REV. 187, 201
(1914).
1984]
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III. THE FCRA AND THE THRESHOLD INACCURACY
REQUIREMENT
Despite the inadequacy of the common law remedies, until re-
cently the problems surrounding inaccurate information processing
were not pressing.28 Formerly, businesses conveyed information con-
cerning the public primarily by means of word of mouth or by man-
ual transmission. This limited the amount of consumer information
available at any one time.29
With the dawning of the computer age, however, both business and
government have implemented information processing techniques to
amass data on the consuming public.3" Credit reporting agencies so-
licit information from their investigators and customers and utilize
this information to compile extensive personal dossiers describing an
individual's financial, personal, and public life.3 This "credit re-
port" is then sold32 to insurers, 33 merchants, 34 and employers. 35
Businesses often find this information to be vitally important in cal-
culating the risk of dealing with a consumer,36 and it is crucial that
28. See supra note 2.
29. Id.
30. Comment, supra note 4, at 590.
Extensive dossiers are easily maintained on individuals who apply for credit, in-
surance, medical care or employment benefits, and are used to assess the eligibil-
ity of or risks posed by a particular individual. In addition to such business
activity, government at every level maintains large scale record keeping systems
which contain personal and sensitive details about individuals who have applied
for government benefits, or whose activities have become the subject of law en-
forcement scrutiny.
Id.
31. Note, supra note 18, at 1036.
32. For example, in one case a defendant's credit investigators prepared approxi-
mately 10-15 reports per day and charged $7.00 per report. Hauser v. Equifax, Inc.,
602 F.2d 811, 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
33. McLaughlin & Vaupel, Constitutional Right of Privacy and Investigative Con.
sumer Reports: Little Brother Is Watching You, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 773, 802
(1975).
34. See Acherley v. Credit Bureau of Sheridan, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 658 (D. Wyo.
1974).
35. See Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 218 S.E.2d 54 (Ga. 1975) (credit agency fur-
nished defamatory information to employer). See also Note, Fair Credit Reporting
4ct: The Casefor Revision, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 409, 424 (1975).
36. Two commentators stated:
In the credit industry alone hundreds of millions of dollars rest upon decisions
regarding the extension of credit to individuals. The decisionmakers must be
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the information be accurate. 37 When agencies report inaccurate in-
formation due to mistaken identification, improper record mainte-
nance, or use of unreliable sources, both the consumer and the
business suffer.38 The consumer unjustly loses an opportunity for
credit, insurance, or employment,39 and the business loses a valuable
informed about a person's solvency and reliability. Automobile insurers need to
know a person's driving record and other pertinent facts before taking the risk of
insuring that person. Life insurance companies should know the medical history
and the physical condition of the applicant, as well as the hobbies and interests of
the applicant if they involve special dangers such as skydiving or mountain-
climbing. An employer should know the experience and abilities of a prospective
employee and the educational background of the applicant and his characteris-
tics which might determine suitability for a particular assignment. The filing of
such information holds certain cost-saving efficiencies which are helpful in the
business world. The information thus gathered allows for "statistical stereotyp-
ing" as a means of making a large number of decisions in the shortest amount of
time.
McLaughlin & Vaupel, supra note 33, at 802.
37. An excerpt from Senator Proxmire's testimony before the Privacy Protection
Study Commission states that:
The Consumer is entitled to an assurance that information about him that is
collected and distributed by consumer reporting agencies is accurate, complete
and relevant to the purposes for which it is used. This is nothing more than
fundamental fairness. The credit or insurance or employment applicant ought
not be the subject of slipshod investigative techniques or haphazard data collec-
tion, or of distorted recording, reporting or evaluation methods. A heavy burden
ought to rest on the reporting agencies to assure that their reports are as accurate
and as thorough as possible.
Note, supra note 35, at 423 n.84 (quoting a statement by Senator Proxmire before the
Privacy Protection Study Commission, Aug. 3, 1976). See also Note, Fair Credit Re-
porting" Are Misleading Reports Reasonable, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 111, 113 (1980).
38. Note, supra note 37, at 112.
39. In a speech before the Senate, Senator Proxmire described a few instances in
which blatant inaccuracies in credit reports resulted in harm:
A Maine housewife has lost virtually all her credit and her life, hospital, and
car insurance due to "bad morals" cited in a credit report. The reason? For 12
years she has been a common law wife to a man whose wife will not divorce him.
A college student from Ohio lost his car insurance on the strength of a neigh-
bor's secret testimony.
A Pennsylvania woman was turned down for major medical coverage by an
insurance company. After repeated interviews with company officials and the
Pennsylvania insurance commissioner, the woman's husband finally learned the
reason. A credit report indicated she was an alcoholic. In actual fact, the woman
had never consumed more than a dozen drinks in 20 years of married life.
A Florida insurance man with 20 years of experience writes that credit investi-
gations are frequently characterized by hearsay evidence, inaccuracies, incompe-
tent investigators, and snide insinuations.
The attitude of credit reporting industry officials on hearsay evidence is not
1984]
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customer or employee.40
The failure of consumers to realize that retailers may refuse to ex-
tend credit to them because of an inaccurate credit report only aggra-
vates the problem.4 Similarly, the credit bureau usually remains
unaware of any problems with inaccurate data because it has little
incentive to detect mistakes.42 As a result, businesses unfairly de-
prive consumers of benefits they rightly deserve. 43 The solution to
these problems lies in a legal scheme that balances the need for credit
information with the need for accuracy.44
Congress attempted to provide this balance in the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act.4 5 Congress passed the FCRA for the expressly stated
purpose of ensuring that consumer reporting agencies adopt reason-
exactly reassuring. For example, the general counsel of Retail Credit testified at
a recent hearing. "What's wrong with hearsay? We all operate on hearsay every-
day. We couldn't have a civilized society without hearsay."
115 CONG. REc. 2411 (1969).
40. Id.
41. Note, supra note 35, at 411.
42. Note, supra note 18, at 1037. Indeed, the nature of the investigatory proce-
dures used by many of the agencies actually lends itself to inaccuracy. See Equifax,
Inc., v. FTC, 678 F.2d 1047 (1 lth Cir. 1982). In Equifax, the FTC charged that the
defendant's practice of rewarding employees for producing adverse information con-
stituted unreasonable procedures under the FCRA. The defendant prevailed, how-
ever, because conflicting evidence also showed that the company strongly
disapproved of production of inaccurate information. 1d. at 1052.
43. Comment, supra note 4, at 591. A merchant may deprive a consumer of his
rights by using the spectre of a "bad credit rating" to coerce the consumer into forego-
ing complaints about defective merchandise. If the consumer refuses to pay because a
product is faulty or because the merchant refuses to replace it, the merchant can sim-
ply threaten to put a smudge on the customer's credit report. Note, supra note 18, at
1039.
44. Note, supra note 37, at 112-13.
45. Note, supra note 35, at 409. For many observers of the credit industry, the
FCRA was long overdue. News accounts depicting credit agencies invading individu-
als' privacy and mishandling delicate information had given the credit industry a
much deserved bad reputation. See supra note 39. In response, industry spokesmen
contended that the number of people injured by faulty reports was quite small consid-
ering the number of reports issued. Also, they asserted that the benefits of the system
far outweighed any of its liabilities. Note, supra note 35, at 414. Senator Proxmire,
one of the credit industry's most outspoken opponents, countered this argument in a
speech before the Senate. Noting that the credit industry issues over 100 million re-
ports each year, he asserted that even given a one percent rate of error, faulty reports
may affect one million people each year. 115 CONG. REC. 2411 (1969).
Recognizing this growing public sentiment in favor of government regulation, the
credit industry created a committee that proposed guidelines for self-regulation. Con-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol27/iss1/7
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able procedures to insure that credit, insurance, and personal infor-
mation is accurate, relevant, and properly used.46 Under the Act, a
consumer reporting agency must use reasonable procedures to assure
that the information it reports is as accurate as possible.47 Because
the Act fails to define "reasonable procedures" and "accuracy," the
judiciary must assume the responsibility for interpreting these broad
terms.
48
When confronted with issues raised under the FCRA, courts first
decide whether the report itself is inaccurate.49 Because courts will
not hold an agency liable under the FCRA unless the information is
"clearly inaccurate," this threshold inquiry stands as a substantial ob-
stacle to an aggrieved consumer. 50 Thus, courts uniformly deny re-
lief 5 ' to a consumer who sues a credit reporting agency alleging that
a credit report is misleading or damaging, though technically accu-
rate. For example, in Austin v. Bankamerica Service Corp.,52 a bank
hired a credit reporting agency to conduct a credit check on a loan
applicant.53 Because the agency's report stated that the plaintiff had
been involved in litigation, the bank declined to extend credit to the
gress rejected these guidelines, opting instead for Senator Proxmire's FCRA. Den-
ney, Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 88 BANKING L.J. 579, 580-83 (1971).
Although Senator Proxmire is legitimately credited as the motivating force behind
the FCRA, he was not the first to suggest the need for such legislation. Congressman
Cornelius Gallagher from New Jersey introduced the idea in a speech on the topic in
the House of Representatives. Although the public generally ignored his speech, a
few of the House leaders recognized the importance of the issue and soon authorized
public hearings. Id. at 580-81.
46. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (1982).
47. Id. The Act provides: "(b) Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a
consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible
accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report re-
lates." Id
48. Note, supra note 37, at 114.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Roseman v. Retail Credit Co., 428 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(plaintiff who lost a job because the report furnished to his employer depicted him in
an unfavorable light not permitted to recover because the report was nevertheless
technically accurate); Middlebrooks v. Retail Credit Co., 416 F. Supp. 1013 (N.D. Ga.
1976) (plaintiff not permitted to recover despite the report's failure to state the out-
come of his arrest).
52. 419 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
53. Id. at 731-32.
1984)
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loan applicant. 4 The applicant sued, claiming that the agency failed
to explain that he was involved in litigation in his official capacity as
a county deputy marshal.5 A federal district court denied relief,
however, holding that recovery under the FCRA requires a clear mis-
statement or inaccuracy in the credit agency's report. 6
Thus, a misleading report may be damaging but not "inaccurate"
under the FCRA. One critic illustrates this problem through the fol-
lowing example: A consumer's credit report simply states: "arrested,
criminal trespass, sentenced, six months."57 The police had arrested
this individual twice: once during a civil rights demonstration in the
1950s and once at a march for equal employment opportunity in the
1960s. 8 Although the report is technically accurate, it is nevertheless
misleading. The report may cause merchants to associate the con-
sumer with felons who routinely are denied credit.
Courts justify failing to require credit agencies to disseminate com-
plete or updated information by ruling that such dissemination is not
required by the FCRA.59 An explicitly stated purpose for enacting
the FCRA, however, was to protect the consumer from misleading
information in credit reports.6° Certainly, the consumer does not
benefit from the courts' rigid interpretation of the FCRA. Courts
54. Id
55. Id at 732. The loan applicant contended that if a company or bank under-
stood that he was involved in litigation as an official, the litigation would have no
bearing on his credit rating. Id
56. Id at 731-32. The court relied on its decision in Peller v. Retail Credit Co.,
359 F. Supp. 1235 (N.D. Ga. 1973). In Peller, the plaintiff sought relief under the
FCRA on the grounds that the results of a polygraph examination showing that the
plaintiff used marijuana were included in a credit report. The court denied relief on
the ground that the report, as subsequently admitted by plaintiff, was accurate. Id. at
732.
57. Miller, Computers, supra note 2, at 9.
58. Zd Professor Miller also speculates about those individuals convicted under a
statute that is later held unconstitutional. If the credit report lists the initial arrest, it
should also include this subsequent information. Id
59. In introducing the FCRA, Senator Proxmire stated: "Perhaps the most seri-
ous problem in the credit reporting industry is the problem of inaccurate or mislead-
ing information." 115 CONG. REC. 2411 (1969).
60. See, e.g., Austin v. Bankamerica Serv. Corp., 419 F. Supp. 730, 732-33 (N.D.
Ga. 1974). The court asserted that if an agency is forced to ascertain whether the
plaintiff previously had been sued in his official or in his personal capacity, the agency
soon may have to determine such questions as whether the suit is for injunctive relief
or damages or whether there is a strong probability of success. The court asserted
that this goes well beyond the requirements of the FCRA. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol27/iss1/7
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should require agencies to do more than simply extract information
out of context from public records.6 Rather, when agencies report
incidents such as a consumer's arrests or litigation, courts should de-
mand that the agencies report the context of those incidents as well.
This requirement would aid in the prevention of misleading reports,
which can be damaging as well as inaccurate. By adopting this re-
quirement, courts would refuse to permit the "clearly inaccurate" re-
quirement to dampen the intended effect of the FCRA.
IV. THE FCRA AND THE DEFINITION OF REASONABLE
PROCEDURES
Once consumers surmount the threshold inaccuracy requirement,
federal law still does not guarantee recovery.62 The FCRA is not a
strict liability statute; rather, it requires only that an agency use "rea-
sonable procedures" to insure "maximum possible accuracy. ' 63 Con-
sequently, an agency that compiles and reports inaccurate data may
not be liable if the court finds that the agency used reasonable proce-
dures. By strictly defining "reasonable procedures," a court can
strengthen the FCRA; conversely, a lax definition of the "reasonable
procedures" requirement will strip the legislation of its effectiveness.
Credit agencies compile data in two ways: by using field investiga-
tors who uncover data through neighborhood interviews and by col-
lecting information from their customers-the merchants. Courts
have failed to define "reasonableness" concretely for either of these
methods. For example, in Hauser v. Equifax, Inc.,' the consumer
61. Under § 1681k of the FCRA, a reporting agency may extract information
from the public record. 15 U.S.C. § 1681k (1982). Although § 1681k(2) requires that
the agency report up-to-date information, that information must be complete at the
time the agency compiles the report. Id. Often, an agency does not use a report until
well after it is compiled. Senator Proxmire describes the problem as follows:
Most credit reporting agencies assiduously cull adverse information on people
from newspapers, court records, and other public documents. These records in-
clude records of arrests, judgments, liens, bankruptcies and the like. However,
most agencies are not anywhere nearly as diligent in following up on the case to
record information favorable to the consumer. Action following arrest is often
dropped ... suits are dismissed. . . Judgments are reversed. However, these
facts are seldom recorded by the credit reporting agencies with the result that
their records are systematically biased against the consumers.
115 CONG. REC. 2412 (1969).
62. Note, supra note 37, at 118.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (1982).
64. 602 F.2d 811 (8th Cir. 1979).
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alleged that the defendant, Equifax, Inc., issued a report that inaccu-
rately described his job to an insurance company, which caused the
company to deny the consumer his disability benefits.65 The plaintiff
asserted that the company's investigators failed to use reasonable
procedures to insure the accuracy of the report.66 The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals acknowledged the inaccuracies in the report but
nevertheless held that Equifax's procedures did not violate the Act
because they were not negligent.67 The court explained that even
when a report is inaccurate, a company is liable only if the proce-
dures used in compiling the report do not meet the minimum stan-
dards of reasonableness.68 In this instance, the investigator spoke to
reliable sources and arrived at a mistaken conclusion about the plain-
tiff's job description.69 While ruling that the company's policy of
conducting interviews constituted reasonable compliance with the
statute, the court failed to indicate what would constitute unreasona-
ble interviewing or investigating techniques.7"
In Millstone v. O'Hanlon,7" however, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered procedures used by a credit agency to be an ideal
example of those proscribed by the FCRA. Millstone, an assistant
managing editor at the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, applied for automo-
bile insurance.72 The insurance company issued the policy but or-
dered a credit check from the defendant company, O'Hanlon.7" The
defendant's report of Millstone was negative, calling him a long-
haired hippie who associated with demonstrators and who was sus-
pected of using drugs.74 An insurance agent who was familiar with
65. Id at 813-15.
66. Id at 814. The plaintiff claimed that the investigator had spent little time
preparing the report and had not interviewed him personally. Id. at 815.
67. Id.
68. Id
69. Id at 813-15.
70. Id at 814. The court noted that the FCRA does not provide for comprehen-
sive regulation of the credit industry. Rather, it establishes broad minimum stan-
dards which collectively are called "reasonable procedures." Id.
71. 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976).
72. Id at 831.
73. Id
74. Id at 831, 834. That credit report, noted by the court, is an example of poten-
tial credit abuses. It reads:
Comment. A poll of four local neighbors at the former address proved that the
assureds were very much dislike [sic] here by all informants, mainly because of
their attitude [sic] and by the non-discipline of their four children. Mrs. Mill-
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Millstone's reputable professional standing prevented the insurance
company from canceling the policy.75 Nevertheless, Millstone re-
quested to see the report and pressed the credit agency to reveal the
basis for its information. The agency discovered that its investigator
had spent only thirty minutes compiling the report, without verifying
its contents.76 The court of appeals chastised O'Hanlon for its failure
to comply with the reasonable procedures requirement.77 The fed-
eral district court had been less subtle in its criticism; it characterized
the investigator's techniques as "so heinous and reprehensible," "so
slipshod and slovenly," and "so wanton as to be clearly wilful non-
compliance with the FCRA. 78
Millstone exemplifies investigatory conduct that falls below the
Act's minimal standard of reasonable care. The Hauser and Mill-
stone decisions suggest that courts that interpret the requirements of
the FCRA expect a credit agency to conduct at least several inter-
views with reliable sources. There is no precise standard. Separate
factual situations in each case prevent courts from correctly defining
the term "reasonable."79
stone would allow her children to run free in the area, and they frequently played
ball in the neighbors' yards, and even gardens, and tore them up on several occa-
sions. . . . In addition, both assureds were reported to be the "hippie" type by
all neighbors and participated in many demonstrations here in Washington and
also housed out of town demonstrators in their house during these demonstra-
tions, and these demonstrators slept on the floors, in the basement and any where
[sic] else they could on assured's property. Assureds were strongly suspected to
be drug users by all neighbors, however this could not be positively substantiated
by any of our informants. Assured is reported to have shoulder length hair and a
beard on one occasion while living here. The risk, a late VW Bus, was used to
transport out of town demonstrators to and from the demonstrations here in
Washington informants [sic] also stated....
Id. at 834, n.5.
75. Id. at 83 1. Millstone, as Assistant Managing Editor of the Post-Dispatch, cov-
ered the White House while at the paper's Washington office. When the company
learned of this, it reinstituted the insurance policy. Id.
76. Id. at 834. The investigator obtained the information in one interview from
an extremely biased informant. 1d.
77. The court characterized the defendant's report as "ripe with innuendo, mis-
statement, and slander." Id.
78. Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 269, 275 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
79. While one may view Millstone as the definitive judicial statement on the con-
duct of field investigators, other cases delineate further an agency's responsibilities
when dealing with investigators who gather consumer information. In Dynes v. TRW
Credit Data, 652 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1981), the plaintiff complained of inaccuracy in a
credit report which said that her auto had been repossessed. The defendant
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In addition to soliciting information from investigators, credit
agencies also gather data from merchants. Nevertheless, an agency
still must follow reasonable procedures to assure the maximum possi-
ble accuracy of the information obtained. A recent Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision, Bryant v. TRW, Inc.,"° discusses this re-
quirement in the context of data collected from merchants.
In Bryant, a mortgage company requested the defendant credit
agency to conduct a credit check on the plaintiff to determine the
plaintiff's eligibility for a mortgage."' Included in the agency's report
was information obtained from other merchants who dealt with the
plaintiff. 2 Although the defendant then reported this information
accurately, the information itself was inaccurate. 83 Because of the
plaintiff's complaints, the agency called the merchants who had sup-
plied the information to verify the reports.84 This effort only con-
firmed the inaccurate information.' The court determined that the
agency must do more than simply act as a conduit of information. 6
To comply with the reasonable procedures standard, the agency must
refer the consumer's complaints to the merchant and request a re-
evaluation or reinvestigation. 87
The Bryant court reiterated the concerns of the Millstone court by
rechecked the data and was satisfied that it was accurate. Although the plaintiff com-
plained again, the defendant claimed its only duty was to reinvestigate once-a sort
of "single reinvestigation" theory. The court rejected this approach and agreed with
the plaintiff by holding that a credit agency must reinvestigate the data until it is
correct. Id. at 36. A company would not have this duty to reinvestigate if it believed
on reasonable grounds that the consumer's claim is frivolous and irrelevant. Id. at 36.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(2) (1982) (setting forth a reasonable grounds standard). Sur-
prisingly, there has been little litigation involving credit agencies that abuse their
power when they define "frivolous and irrelevant" complaints.
80. 689 F.2d 72 (6th Cir. 1982).
81. Id. at 74.
82. 1d. at 74-76.
83. Id. at 74-77. The information showed that the plaintiff was delinquent on his
account with two stores. This information was inaccurate because at the time the
agency issued the report the plaintiff was behind on his payments to the two stores,
but he was not so far behind as to be considered delinquent. Id. at 76-77.
84. Id. at 79.
85. Id
86. Id The court emphasized the importance of an accurate credit report. The
court stated that the defendant's claim that an agency merely has to report accurately
the information given to it would result in a judicial repeal of the statute that Con-
gress adopted after much consideration. Id. at 77.
87. Id at 79.
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emphasizing the importance of accurate credit reporting. 88 The Bry-
ant court limited its holding to the facts of the instant case.8 9 Never-
theless, Bryant stands as a victory for consumers because it rejects the
role of the credit agency as an indiscriminate gatherer of unverified
information. It confirms the independent responsibility of the agen-
cies to the consumer when soliciting information from merchants.9"
The Millstone and Bryant courts' interpretation of the reasonable
procedures standard of the FCRA are favorable to the consumer.
Although each case appears to demand only a minimal standard of
care from the agencies when those agencies compile their consumer
data, both decisions restrict an agency's discretionary power. Mill-
stone and Bryant will promote the collection of accurate information
pertaining to a consumer's personal and financial status.
V. TECHNICAL ADVANCES IN FAIR CREDIT REPORTING
Once credit agencies collect and compile data, their responsibilities
shift to managing and reporting this information. At this stage, the
computer revolution takes on special significance because of the
credit industry's extensive dependence upon computer technology for
storing and transmitting data. Clearly, the nature of computer data
alone changes the complexion of problems surrounding accurate
credit reporting.9' By using computerized data an agency adds a step
to the process of handling credit information.92 Rather than simply
storing manually compiled data, clerical workers must also keypunch
the data onto computer cards or directly into the computer system.93
88. 1d. at 78.
89. Id at 78-79. The court stated that "a consumer reporting agency does not
necessarilV comply with [the Act] by simply reporting in an accurate manner the infor-
mation it receives from creditors." Id. at 78 (emphasis in the original). By italicizing
.'necessarily," id. at 78. the court suggests the possibility that in some instances simply
reporting the information may be sufficient. Second, the court emphasized the de-
fendants' awareness of prior instances in which the plaintiff had similar problems
with inaccurate reports. Id. The court stated that, "[a]bsent these facts, we would
have a quite different case.- Id. at 79.
90, The court also upheld the district court's determination that the plaintiffs at-
torney should receive reasonable attorney's fees. Id. at 80. Without this type ofjudi-
cial support, plaintiffs might rarely have the resources to challenge a credit agency.
9 1. See generally Nycum, Computer Abuses Raise New Legal Problems, 61 A.B.A.
J. 444 (1975).
92. Miller, Personal Privacy, supra note 2, at 1114-15.
93. Id. at 1114.
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This additional step increases the likelihood of error.9 4 Significantly,
a simple clerical error in this type of record can seriously harm a
consumer.
95
Similarly, because computer storage lends itself to strict categorical
classification,96 an agency may place certain ambiguous data into the
most closely related category. This placement might have the effect
of tainting a consumer's record. For instance, a "fair" report might
be forced into either the "good" or "bad" risk category.97 Finally,
the expense of computer storage will discourage agencies from in-
cluding in a data file explanations that the consumer might want an
agency to consider.98
The nature of the computer data itself, however, presents the most
volatile issue for those monitoring the credit industry. Computer
data creates the impression of possessing a much higher degree of
accuracy than manually produced data.9 9 One observing a credit re-
port on a computer printout may place undue reliance on the report
and then fail to verify the accuracy of the data. Highly centralized
computer data banks'00 compound these problems. These systems
distribute data nationwide that may be inaccurate.' 0'
Despite the complexity of computer technology, an agency cannot
dodge responsibility for inaccurate credit reports by rationalizing
94. Id. The author notes that a keypunch operator or clerical worker has the ca-
pacity to inflict as much damage through negligence, sheer stupidity, or lack of sensi-
tivity as a person acting through malice. He suggests that the problems in this
additional stage of handling will persist until extremely accurate input devices, such
as optical scanners, become operational. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Note, supra note 18, at 1040 n.29.
97. Miller, PersonalPrivacy, supra note 2, at 1117. The use of evaluative informa-
tion in such conclusive categories becomes particularly dangerous when others who
view the information interpret the categories differently. One viewer analyzing the
data may consider "fair" an average performance, while another may see this same
evaluative term as indicative of a very poor performance. Id
98. See id at 1116-17.
99. Id at 1116. The computer's image of infallibility prompted a government
official to remark that just because data is stored in a computer does not make it
accurate. Id
100. Miller, Personal Privacy, supra note 2, at 1115. Because large numbers of
local and regional computers may be linked together into extensive national and in-
ternational networks, information can be stored and carried far from its point of rec-
ordation. This enhances the possibility that persons not associated with the data's
collection will interpret it inaccurately. Id.
101. Id.
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mistakes as "computer error."' 1 2 Instead, courts insist that a com-
pany's duty to exercise reasonable care in reporting credit data does
not abate simply because it uses a computer.'" 3 Courts consider the
characteristics of computer technology and demand that credit agen-
cies modify their procedures to ensure the greatest possible accuracy
in credit records. Two recent cases illustrate this point.
In Lowry v. Credit Bureau, Inc. of Georgia,"° a bank checked the
plaintiffs credit with the defendant credit agency after the plaintiff
applied for a loan.'° 5 The credit agency had programmed its system
so that its customers had direct access to the system.'0 6 This arrange-
ment allowed a merchant to confuse files with similar names and in-
formation." 7 In Lowry, the bank retrieved the wrong file and, acting
102. Indeed, causes of action such as breach of warranty in computer contracts
and tortious misrepresentation in computer sales rest partially on the notion that com-
puters are inherently different from ordinary business machines. Note, Unconsciona-
bilitr and the Fundamental Breach Doctrine in Computer Contracts, 57 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 547, 552-53 (1982). Those acquiring a computer for business expose themselves
to more risks than if they had acquired a regular machine. Id. at 554.
103. Nycum & Lowell, Common Law and Statutory Liability/or Inaccurate Com-
puter-Based Data. 30 EMORY L.J. 445, 453 (1981).
The principle that a computer mistake does not shield a company from liability is
well established. In Pompeii Estates. Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 91 Misc. 2d
233, 397 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1977), the court held a utility liable for wrong-
fully terminating electricity at an unoccupied home. The company had been sending
the bill to the house when it should have been sending the bill to the builder. Simi-
larly. in Ford Motor Co. v. Swarens, 447 S.W.2d 53 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969), the defend-
ant. Ford Motor Co., blamed faulty repossession of the plaintiff's automobile on
computer error. The court rejected this defense stating:
Ford explains that this whole incident occurred because of a mistake by a com-
puter. Men feed data to a computer and men interpret the answer the computer
spews forth. In this computerized age, the law must require that men in the use
of computerized data regard those with whom they are dealing as more impor-
tant than a perforation on a card. Trust in the infallibility of a computer is
hardly a defense ...
Id. at 57.
104. 444 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
105. 1d. at 543.
106. Id. The merchants would supply the computer with as much relevant infor-
mation about an individual as possible. The computer would then list the names of
those people whose records matched up closely with this information based on a
programmed minimum number of "points of correspondence" between the two sets
of data. The merchant would then choose which credit history he wished to review.
Id
107. The plaintiff gave the bank his name as James F. Lowry, but the file the bank
extracted from the defendant's computer concerned James Frank Lowry of a different
address. Id. at 543.
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on this information, rejected plaintiff's application. °8 The plaintiff
then sued, alleging that the credit agency failed to use reasonable
procedures to insure the accuracy of the credit report.'0 9 The court
held that the agency's use of a computer program that allowed a
merchant to automatically add information to a consumer's file may
constitute a violation of the FCRA. "' The court's decision rests on
the fundamental proposition that the FCRA demands that reason-
able procedures be used in the "preparation" of a credit report."'
The court reasoned that "preparation" of a report was a continuous
process' 2 and because the agency failed to verify the accuracy of
information added by merchants, the practice violated the reasonable
procedures requirement." 1
3
A similar problem arose in a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals deci-
sion, Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchants' Association."14 The
plaintiff applied for credit with Gulf and Montgomery Ward. 115
When Gulf conducted a credit check on the plaintiff, the credit
agency's computer reported information on another individual whose
name was similar to the plaintiff's." '6 After Gulf had finished using
108. The bank rejected the plaintiffs application because the file of the wrong
individual, James Frank Lowry, listed him as in the midst of bankruptcy proceedings.
Id.
109. Id. at 544. The court stated the issue succinctly: "The crux of the plaintiff's
complaint is the potential for confusion of reports inherent in the defendant's com-
puter system." Id Despite this statement of the issue the court did not ultimately rest
its decision on that claim. It specifically stated that a credit agency's use of the wrong
reports is not the basis for a federal claim. According to the court, the real problem
stemmed from the merchants' ability to feed data directly into the computer, allowing
a merchant to put the plaintifis social security number into James Frank Lowry's file.
This mismatched information allowed the plaintiff to meet the threshold inaccuracy
requirement for basing a claim on the FCRA. Id
110. Id. The court denied the defendant credit agency's motion for summary
judgment. The court further ruled that it would not be impossible for the plaintiff to
satisfy the FCRA requirement of establishing damages resulting from the defendant's
breach. Id See supra note 109.
111. 444 F. Supp. at 544. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (1982).
112. 444 F. Supp. at 544.
113. Id The court emphasized that permitting the defendant's procedures to go
unchecked would be completely contrary to the broad aims of the FCRA. Id.
114. 682 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1982).
115. Id at 511.
116. Id at 511-12. The defendant's system worked as follows: The defendant
updated its files using a computerized "automatic capturing" feature. A subscriber,
Gulf in this case, had to feed certain identifying information from its own terminal
into the defendant's central computer to gain access to the credit history of a particu-
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the erroneous file and had added information about the plaintiff to
the file, the agency "recaptured" the file into its terminal. Montgom-
ery Ward subsequently ran a credit check on the plaintiff and re-
ceived the garbled data in the incorrect file. Because of adverse
information in this file, they denied the plaintiffs credit request."t 7
Gulf was able to obtain the inaccurate file primarily because the
agency's computer required no minimum number of "points of corre-
spondence" between the merchant's information about a consumer
and the file purporting to be the consumer's before a merchant could
add or delete information from the credit report file." 8 In addition,
the defendant had no way of verifying whether the added informa-
tion was correct. "9 The court reiterated the principles set forth in the
Lowry decision 2 ° and held that the credit agency had a continuing
duty to assure the accuracy of newly added information.' 2 ' The
court emphasized the need for an internal auditing system to prevent
errors. 1
22
Thus, both Lowry and Thompson illustrate that unchecked reliance
on information compiled by computers can be problematic for the
credit industry during the collecting and reporting stages. Agencies
lar consumer. When the defendant received this information, its computer searched
its records and displayed on the subscriber's terminal the credit history file that most
nearly matched that of the consumer. The terminal operator then could decide
whether to accept the given file as that of the consumer. When an operator accepted a
file. the computer automatically captured into the file any information the sub-
scriber's terminal inserted. In Thompson, the Gulf terminal operator mistakenly ac-
cepted a file that he or she thought was the plaintiffs, and the defendant's computer
automatically placed the captured information about the plaintiff into the wrong file.
The erroneously accepted file and the plaintiff's file therefore became hopelessly
mixed, As a result, when the Montgomery Ward operator checked plaintiff's credit
report. there was a mixture of information on William Douglas Thompson, III (plain-
tiff) and William Daniel Thompson, Jr.
117. id.
118. Id at 513.
119. Id
120. See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
121. 682 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1982). The court noted:
Section 1681e(b) does not impose strict liability for any inaccurate credit report,
but only a duty of reasonable care in preparation of the report. That duty ex-
tends to updating procedures, because preparations of a consumer report should
be viewed as a continuing process and the obligation to insure accuracy arises
with every addition of information.
Id. at 513 (citation omitted).
122. Id. at 513. The court seemed to favor a system demanding a certain number
of points of correspondence as an adequate auditing procedure to foster accuracy. Id.
1984)
Washington University Open Scholarship
268 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 27:249
must realize that proper safeguards such as internal auditing systems
which monitor data are necessary,12 3 because the many risks associ-
ated with computer use 124 may cause significant harm to
consumers. 125
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the consumer-oriented interpretation of the FCRA in re-
cent cases dealing with the "reasonable procedures" requirement,
several problems remain. Courts still insist that the consumer may
challenge the reasonableness of an agency's procedures only if the
report is clearly inaccurate.' 26 In defining what constitutes inaccu-
racy, courts continue improperly to exclude incomplete information
about a plaintiffs arrest or litigation.'27 Similarly, courts have not
yet established a standard definition of the term "reasonable" where
the reasonable procedures requirement is concerned.'2 8
Although these and other problems exist with the FCRA, 2 9 courts
123. See Nycum & Lowell, supra note 103, at 454-55.
124. Note, supra note 102, at 553. Parties often fail to understand the unique risks
accompanying extensive computer use. Id.
125. Id The author notes that the survival of a business may depend solely on
the efficient use of its computer systems. Id See Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Hon-
eywell, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979) (defendant liable for selling plaintiff company a
computer system which malfunctioned repeatedly and ultimately led to plaintifls in-
solvency). Note that if the credit agency is held liable for reporting inaccurate data
due to a computer malfunction, the agency may seek relief from the computer com-
pany. A court might base recovery upon either breach of warranty (UCC approach)
or tortious misrepresentation. For an excellent discussion of this rapidly expanding
area of law, see Tunik, supra note 1. See also Bigelow, Counseling the Computer User,
52 A.B.A. J. 451, 452 (1966) (discussing relevant factors in contracting for computers).
126. See supra notes 28-61 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 52-61.
128. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
129. Senator Proxmire specified two problems with the FCRA:
Under the present law, consumers get no prior notification that reports will be
prepared about them. Only in the case of investigative reports . . is the con-
sumer even told afterwards that a report has been or may be prepared. Of all the
information that might be collected, medical information is certainly the most
sensitive and personal. Yet to this day consumers who sign medical authoriza-
tion forms have no clear indication of the virtually indiscriminate uses that may
be made of that data in the future.
The present law requires that when a consumer is denied credit, insurance or
employment on the basis of a report, he be advised of the identity of the report-
ing agency which supplied the report. But denials of benefits or increases in the
charges for those benefits, are not the only adverse actions that a consumer report
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appear to be moving in the proper direction. Regarding the investi-
gation stage, the Bryant decision indicates that courts disapprove of
the credit industry's indiscriminate compilation of information with-
out asking questions or verifying data. Moreover, the Thompson case
illustrates the agency's responsibilities in managing and reporting the
data once it has been collected. These decisions show that courts are
beginning to shift the cost of erroneous credit reporting directly onto
the agencies that have the ability to more easily bear and distribute
these costs. 130 These decisions also show that the evolving judicial
attitude seems to be more in keeping with the fundamental purpose
of the FCRA-that is, to guarantee fairness and equity to the
consumer. 131
may precipitate, and the Act leaves those other possibilities untouched. I under-
stand, also, that earlier testimony before this Commission revealed that many life
insurance companies make their decisions on the basis of reports supplied by the
Medical Information Bureau, even though that Bureau's own bylaws prohibit
such reliance. Here is one clear case where consumers are being affected by re-
ports they may never know have been made.
Note, supra note 35, at 413 n.35 (statement of Senator Proxmire before the Privacy
Protection Study Commission).
130. Note, supra note 18, at 1045. The author states that because the credit
agency is at the locus of two points, information collection and dissemination, and
money collection and expenditures, the bureau is perfectly suited to evaluate any risks
involved and then to spread the costs of injuries. Id. at 1046.
131. See supra note 59.
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